What had other civilizations done to their soils?
According to Lowdermilk’s later recollection, the idea began when a “thoughtful member” of the House Appropriations Committee asked Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace whether the Department had ever studied lands that had been cultivated for two thousand years or more.
Wallace answered that it had not.
Whatever discussions followed, the surviving prospectus shows how the Department transformed a congressman’s question into the justification for a major international investigation.
A new frontier in conservation
“[W]e are confronted with a new frontier in the conservation of our basic land resources including soils and waters,” the U.S. Department of Agriculture prospectus announced. “But the conservation of soil and waters and the control of soil erosion and torrential floods to maintain a sure basis of national welfare is a large and long undertaking, and we wish to profit by the experience of older countries in these vital problems.”¹
The proposed survey would examine the “results of past and present land utilization” in older countries and gather information that could guide American research, policy, erosion control, water conservation, and flood prevention. Its ultimate objective was “a sustaining and permanent agriculture.”²
Taken together, the prospectus amounted to a Progressive nationalist call to arms. The nation’s future could no longer be entrusted entirely to the decisions of individual landholders. Congress had identified soil erosion as a threat to national welfare, adopted conservation as federal policy, and created the administrative machinery to carry it out. Scientists and government experts would diagnose the damage, identify proper land uses, and direct the transition from exploitation to permanent agriculture.
What the eight reasons added up to
The Soil Conservation Service listed eight reasons for undertaking such a long and extensive survey. Beneath the administrative language were several powerful assumptions about land, population, and the role of government.
The first was that the American frontier could no longer expand.
“Our land is occupied; the best lands are in cultivation,” the prospectus declared. This did not mean that every acre had been settled or that western migration had literally ended. It meant that the nation could no longer respond to exhausted soil by abandoning worn-out farms and moving onto better land elsewhere. Farmers and stockmen would have to remain in place and learn permanent stewardship.
The second assumption was that private misuse of land had become a public danger.
Eroded soil did not respect property lines. It washed into streams, filled reservoirs, increased the severity of floods, obstructed navigation, damaged downstream farms, and reduced the nation’s future food-producing capacity. The Soil Conservation Service therefore framed land use as a national problem requiring federal intervention, coordination, and limits upon the landholder’s freedom to damage resources on which others depended.
Wasteful agriculture would have to be corrected through scientific knowledge. The farmer would continue to work the land, but the farmer would no longer be regarded as the sole authority on the consequences of his practices.
Third, Congress had already committed the federal government to this new course. The Soil Conservation Act of 1935, the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1936, and the Omnibus Flood Control Act of 1936 had formally redirected national policy from exploitation toward conservation and flood control.
The SCS was still a young New Deal agency. Its predecessor, the Soil Erosion Service, had been created only in 1933. Yet the federal government was already spending hundreds of millions of dollars each year on conservation and flood-control programs. A public undertaking of such magnitude demanded research, standards, and evidence. The Department needed reliable knowledge quickly, and the experience of older countries offered a vast field of observation.
Some civilizations had maintained productive soils over centuries. Others had exhausted their lands, buried reservoirs in silt, stripped hillsides of vegetation, or left once-prosperous agricultural regions unable to support their former populations. The Old World could be treated as a collection of long-running experiments whose results were already written across the landscape.
The world was running out of room
The prospectus carried the closed-frontier argument beyond the United States:
“The best lands of the earth are now occupied.”
Land, population, reclamation, settlement, and conquest were inseparable in the document’s reasoning. Countries facing crowded populations were seeking solutions “in different ways,” the prospectus observed, “some by reclamation and conservation, others by conquest.”
The document was written in 1938 as war clouds gathered over Europe. Population pressure and competition for territory were widely understood as causes—or at least justifications—for expansion and war. The SCS prospectus presented conservation and reclamation as another possible response. If already occupied land could be made more productive, perhaps larger populations could be supported without the seizure of additional territory.
That assumption would later become central to Lowdermilk’s thinking about Palestine. The question of how many people a territory could support was not, in his mind, fixed by nature alone. It depended upon the kind of agriculture practiced there, the water developed, the soil conserved, and the expertise applied.
A “primeval continent”?
One statement in the prospectus deserves particular attention. It described the United States as a “new country” that had only recently begun utilizing the resources of a “primeval continent.”
That language erased millennia of Indigenous occupation and land management. It transformed conquest, removal, and dispossession into a simpler national story: Americans had entered an unused continent, developed its resources, exhausted the frontier, and now had to learn how to remain permanently upon the land they possessed.
The prospectus did not yet articulate Lowdermilk’s later doctrine of “beneficial use,” but it established the premise on which that doctrine would rest. Systems of land use could be scientifically compared and ranked. Experts would determine which practices maintained productivity, which destroyed the soil, which could support larger populations, and which should be replaced.
That authority could reach beyond advising an individual farmer. It could eventually be used to judge whole societies according to how productively and permanently they occupied the land.
Turning observation into policy
The findings were not intended to remain in a travel diary or government report. They would be published for technical workers and the public, converted into illustrated lectures, tested with state agricultural experiment stations, and used to reconsider both the SCS research program and its conservation work on American farms.
The survey was designed as a chain of expert transmission. Foreign experience would be observed, recorded, classified, tested, and incorporated into federal policy.
The United States would send an expert into the old lands, and the old lands would be made to answer America’s questions.
Send Lowdermilk
By July 1938, the Department had selected Walter Clay Lowdermilk, who headed the SCS research program, to undertake the eighteen-month survey.
He had studied forestry and geology in Europe, investigated deforestation and erosion in China, conducted controlled watershed experiments in California, and helped build the federal conservation program in Washington. He had spent much of his professional life studying the relationship between the fate of the soil and the fate of the people who depended upon it.
Now he would turn entire civilizations into case studies.
His assignment was to determine what centuries of land use had done to the soils of the Old World—and what those soils could teach the United States before it was too late.




